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Combining Familial Searching and Abandoned
DNA: Potential Privacy Outcomes and the
Future of Canada’s National DNA Data Bank
Amy Conroy*
Since Alec Jeffreys discovered the identifying potential of DNA in 1984, ge-
netic science has become a mainstay of criminal investigations around the world.1
DNA may be retrieved from a crime scene in the form of blood, saliva, skin cells,
hair, or other genetic material, and an anonymous DNA profile developed from the
genetic tissue.2 If a perfectly matching profile for the crime scene profile can be
located from genetic tissue obtained from an identified individual, police will have
extremely valuable evidence placing the identified person at the crime scene. The
process, known as “DNA profiling”, has helped solve numerous crimes in Canada
and the rest of the world.3 Based on its successes in the criminal context, Canada
and most international jurisdictions have established national DNA data banks to
maximize the forensic capabilities of genetic information.4
* The author would like to thank Dr. Teresa Scassa for her helpful comments on this
article and Dr. Elizabeth Judge for comments on a previous work which has been
incorporated into this article.
1 For an account of Jeffreys’ discovery, see J.D. Aronson. “DNA Fingerprinting on Trial:
The Dramatic Early History of a New Forensic Technique” (2005) 29:3 Endeavour
126.
2 Cst. A.O. Ramey. “DNA Typing Evidence: Splitting Hairs” (1993) 55(9) R.C.M.P. Ga-
zette 1, at 1 [Ramey]; and Jonathan Kimmelman. “Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Sur-
vey of Trends in Criminal DNA Databanking” (2000) 28 Journ. Of Law, Med. & Eth-
ics 209 at 209.
3 One of the earliest Canadian cases involving DNA evidence was the first-degree mur-
der trial of Allan Legere, whose conviction was largely based on genetic evidence that
linked him to four violent murders: R. v. Legere, 1994 CarswellNB 8, 156 N.B.R. (2d)
321, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 139, 35 C.R. (4th) 1 (N.B. C.A.); John Jack Walsh, “R. v. Allan
Joseph Legere and DNA Evidence: Reminiscences” (2010) Paper prepared for the Dig-
ital Law Collection Project at the University of New Brunswick Law School [Walsh].
Since that time, DNA profiling has solved a number of Canadian crimes. The National
DNA Data Bank Advisory Committee recently reported that Canada’s National DNA
Data Bank has assisted in the investigation of over 1000 homicides, 1933 sexual as-
saults, 366 attempted murders, and 1700 armed robberies: National DNA Data Bank
Advisory Committee, National DNA Data Bank Advisory Committee Annual Report
(Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2009-2010), at 6 [NDDB Advisory Committee An-
nual Report, 2009-2010].
4 Canada’s National DNA Data Bank was established in June of 2000 and operates under
the authority of the DNA Identification Act, S.C. 1998, c. 37 [DNA Identification Act]:
Janna Kerr. “Canada’s DNA Data Bank up and Running” Forensics (September,
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As forensic science continues on a course of rapid development, Canadian law
must attempt to balance the benefits that flow from supporting the work of criminal
investigators against the risks to individual rights affected by use of DNA in the
criminal context. One of the modern advancements in DNA science is familial
searching, a technique that allows criminal investigators to identify potential sus-
pects based on the familial links that can be observed between the separate profiles
of genetically related individuals.5 Though familial searching can be highly useful
in the criminal context, it is presently prohibited under the terms of the DNA Identi-
fication Act, the legislation that regulates state use of Canada’s National DNA Data
Bank (NDDB).6 While there is interest in amending the statutory framework to
allow familial searching of Canada’s NDDB, there are simultaneous concerns about
the risks to individual rights and interests, including in particular the risks posed to
individual privacy. Accordingly, the Canadian government has requested further
study of the issue before any amendment is made to authorize the use of familial
searching as part of the NDDB scheme.7
The response to the government’s request for further inquiry into familial
searching must include a discussion that situates use of the technique within the
2000). The first country in the world to launch a national forensic database was the UK
in 1995, followed closely by New Zealand in 1996. While the UK’s database was im-
plemented without specific statutory authority, it was supported by existing statutes
including the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60 and the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act 1994, c. 33. The relevant statute in New Zealand is the Criminal
Investigations (Blood Samples) Act Pub. Act 1995 No. 55. At the federal level in the
US, the national DNA data bank began operations in 1998 under the DNA Identifica-
tion Act, 1994 U.S.C. 14132, by which time all fifty states had also independently en-
acted the necessary legislation to authorize collection of DNA samples at the state
level. For details on the establishment of databases in the individual states, see Rose-
mary Walsh, “The United States and the Development of DNA Data Banks” Privacy
International (20 February, 2006). Additional databases were established across the
European Union, including in Germany, the Netherlands, and France, all in 1998: Ger-
many: s. 3 Identitatsfeststellungsgesetz and ss. 2, 7, 8 Bundeskriminalamtgesetz (Act
for the Federal Criminal Investigation Office); Netherlands: Law on DNA Investigation
in Criminal Proceedings s. 4, Art. 14(4)(a); France: Law of 17th June 1998 relating to
the repression of sexual infringements, Law of 15 November concerning national se-
curity, Law of 18th March relating to the FNAEG, Decree of 18 May 2000, Decree of
25 May 2004.
5 Amelia Bellamy-Royds & Sonya Norris, New Frontiers in Forensic DNA Analysis:
Implications for Canada’s National DNA Data Bank (Ottawa: Library of Parliament,
2009) at 10 [Bellamy-Royds & Norris].
6 The prohibition on familial searching is pursuant to the statutory requirement that an
offender’s identity can normally only be communicated to investigators if a search pro-
duces an exact match to a comparator profile. An exception may apply where there is a
“questionable” match, which might occur where a degraded sample is searched and the
analysis does not exclude the similar profile as a true match: DNA Identification Act,
supra note 4 at s. 6.
7 House of Commons Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs,
Public Protection, Privacy and the Search for Balance: A Statutory Review of the DNA
Identification Act, Final Report (2010) at 64 [Standing Senate Committee Review].
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broader Canadian legal context and amongst existing investigative practices in Ca-
nadian policing. In fact, the authorizing amendment now under consideration
would facilitate a troubling relationship between familial searching and police reli-
ance on a seemingly separate forensic activity, the analysis of abandoned DNA.
This article aims to respond to the government’s request by explaining the nature of
that relationship and by arguing that the combined use of familial searching and
analysis of abandoned DNA would present a serious risk for genetic privacy. The
risk is particularly acute given that it would effectively circumvent the existing jus-
tification for the NDDB, leading to inclusion of individuals whose DNA profiles
have not been uploaded directly onto the data bank. To substantiate this main argu-
ment, this article proceeds in three parts. The first describes the current Canadian
law on familial searching and the ongoing interest in amending the DNA Identifica-
tion Act to allow use of this technique on NDDB data. The second part explains the
current Canadian law on police use of abandoned DNA, which has largely been
shaped by section 8 claims in a series of post-Charter cases. The third part explains
how police might depend on the current law allowing broad police use of aban-
doned DNA to facilitate follow-up on leads derived from familial searching of
NDDB information. The possibility presents a major policy consideration that must
be acknowledged within the discussion of whether and to what extent familial
searching of the NDDB should be authorized in Canada.
I. THE LAW ON FAMILIAL SEARCHING
Familial searching is a forensic technique that is based on the likelihood that
genetically related individuals have similar genetic profiles.8 By examining two
distinct genetic profiles, trained forensic analysts can estimate the likelihood that
the two source individuals share a genetic relationship. Commonalities in the ge-
netic profiles of related individuals naturally occur because every individual inher-
its half of his or her DNA profile from each genetic parent.9 Based on these pat-
terns of genetic inheritance, it is certain that every person has a DNA profile that is
similar to the one belonging to each of his or her genetic parent.10 By extension,
full genetic siblings will also share many commonalities in genetic profiles; to a
lesser extent, so will genetic half siblings, first cousins, nieces and nephews, aunts
and uncles, and so on.11
The science of familial searching provides police with a scientifically sup-
ported method of extending the utility of DNA samples already in the state’s pos-
session. Where traditional DNA profiling does not produce a lead, it is possible for
investigators to look for potential genetic relatives of the source individual as a
possible route to a suspect. The approach is best explained by reference to real uses
8 Bellamy-Royds & Norris, supra note 5 at 10.
9 Erin Murphy, “Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases” (2010) 109
Michigan Law Review 291 at 295 [Murphy].
10 Ibid, at 295.
11 Ibid; William C. Thompson, “The Potential for Error in Forensic DNA Testing (and
how that Complicates the use of DNA Databases for Criminal Identification)” (2008)
Paper produced for the National Conference of the Council for Responsible Genetics
(Forensic DNA Databases and Race: Issues, Abuses, and Actions) at 8.
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of familial searching in the criminal context. The first known case occurred in the
UK in 2004.12 An intoxicated man dropped a brick from an overpass and through
the window of a passing truck, causing a fatal heart attack for the driver.13 Investi-
gators found a drop of blood on the brick, which was later found to have come from
a cut on the hand of the man who had caused the accident.14 The search for a full
match between the DNA profile obtained from the drop of blood and profiles held
on the national DNA data bank did not produce any leads.15 A search for a partial
match, however, produced a profile with enough similarity to indicate a genetic
relationship between the source individuals; an interview with the person whose
DNA provided the partial match led police to Craig Harman.16 Harman’s DNA
provided a perfect match to the crime scene profile and led to his conviction for
manslaughter.17
Since that first known use, a number of crimes have been solved by familial
searching, such as the notorious case of the “Dearne Valley Shoe Rapist” in En-
gland and the case of the “Grim Sleeper” in California, both involving dangerous
offenders who had evaded police for years until familial searching provided a nec-
essary breakthrough in each investigation.18 Canadian criminal investigators have
also used familial searching in at least one case. The incident occurred in 2002,
following the sexual assault and murder of Doreen Bradley in Alberta.19 Provincial
police obtained an anonymous profile from DNA found on the victim’s body and
compared it to DNA profiles obtained from a random group of males in the com-
munity.20 When the search failed to produce an exact match, the samples were
tested for a partial match; the process identified two individuals possibly related to
the unknown perpetrator.21 Follow-up on this lead brought police to Landon Karas,
12 Sonia M. Suter, “All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching” (2010) 23:2
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 309 at 323 [Suter].




17 Ibid; Henry T. Greely, Daniel P. Riordan, Nanibaa’ A. Garrison, & Joanna L. Moun-
tain, “Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin”
(2006) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 248, at 249.
18 The “Dearne Valley Shoe Rapist” was apprehended in 2006 and had earned his nick-
name by collecting shoes from his victims: Suter, supra note 12 at 310. In the case of
the “Grim Sleeper”, police gathered DNA evidence implicating Lonnie Franklin Jr.
when one of his relatives discarded a slice of pizza containing enough DNA to support
a familial analysis: Terry McCarthy “The Case of the Grim Sleeper” Time (5 December
2011) [McCarthy].
19 RCMP, The National DNA Data Bank of Canada: Annual Report (Ottawa, Canada:
RCMP, 2007-2008) at 9 [RCMP Annual Report 2007-2008]; Douglas Quan, “U.S. Us-
ing Familial DNA in Policing; but Canadian Authorities Question Legal and Moral
Implications of Practice” The Vancouver Sun (21 May, 2011) [Quan].
20 RCMP Annual Report 2007-2008, supra note 19 at 9.
21 Ibid.
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the son of one of the identified persons.22 Karas was convicted of the violent crime
when his DNA profile proved to be a match to the profile obtained from the crime
scene sample.23
While the Alberta case is evidence that Canadian police have used familial
searching outside of the NDDB scheme, the technique cannot be applied to NDDB
data because of an implicit prohibition in the wording of the DNA Identification
Act. The implicit ban flows from the rule that the Commissioner responsible for the
operations of the NDDB may only communicate to other law enforcement authori-
ties: (i) the fact that a match to the anonymous profile being searched is not in the
databank; (ii) information relating to a matching profile if one is found; or (iii)
information relating to a similar profile provided the Commissioner has not ruled
out the possibility that the profile might be a match to the anonymous profile,
which might occur, for instance, with a degraded sample where there is limited
profile information to compare.24 The prohibition against familial searching is gen-
erally in keeping with Canada’s NDDB scheme, which was purposefully restricted
in a number of ways after a public consultation process that preceded the establish-
ment of the data bank and highlighted the privacy and other concerns that arise
through state use of DNA for forensic purposes.25 In addition to the prohibition on
familial searching, one of the main limitations in the DNA Identification Act is that
the data bank may only contain the profile information of convicted offenders,
thereby excluding the possibility for police to upload any profiles that might other-
wise be obtained from suspects, arrestees, or volunteers.26 The combined use of
familial searching and analysis of abandoned DNA would circumvent that particu-
lar limitation, an outcome that will be returned to in the final part of this article.
The limitations on NDDB operations serve as recognition of the unique char-
acteristics of DNA that set this type of personal information apart from other infor-
mation that may also be useful to forensic investigators, such as evidence relating
to fingerprints, driver’s licenses, identified mug shots or other photographs, tax fil-
ings, or utility usage within a given home. The unique considerations that set ge-
22 Ibid; Karen Kleiss, “Supreme Court Won’t Allow Killer to Appeal” The Edmonton
Journal (28 March, 2008) [Kleiss]; Quan, supra note 20.
23 Karas attempted to challenge his conviction but was denied a new trial by the Alberta
Court of Appeal, and later denied leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada:
RCMP Annual Report 2007-2008, supra note 20 at 9; Kleiss, supra note 22; Quan,
supra note 19.
24 DNA Identification Act, supra note 4 at s. 6.
25 For details, see Solicitor General, Establishing a National DNA Data Bank: Consulta-
tion Document (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 2.
26 There are currently over 265 offences that can lead to inclusion of an offender’s DNA
on the NDDB, ranging from very serious crimes such as murder, manslaughter, and
aggravated assault to non-violent and non-sexual crimes such as perjury, libel known to
be false, and various drug-related offences: Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 at s.
487.04 [Criminal Code]. While arrestees and suspects are not included on the NDDB,
police can collect samples from such individuals for exclusionary purposes within a
specific investigation relating to a designated offence where the suspect has given his
or her consent to the collection, or upon obtaining a judicial warrant under the Criminal
Code RSC 1985, c C-46 at s. 487.05(1).
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netic information apart from these other types of personal information include the
fact that DNA information: (i) can reveal details about the genetic relatives of the
individual from whom a sample is derived, which may impact the person’s family
for generations to come; (ii) can be obtained from bodily tissues that are routinely
and unconsciously shed by individuals in the course of their daily activities; (iii)
has the power to predict the future health of an individual, which may lead to dis-
criminatory treatment in some cases; (iv) may have cultural significance for certain
persons or groups; and (v) may hold significance that is not understood at the time
of sample collection.27
The above considerations support the need for caution in broadening the scope
of NDDB operations, a difficult task given the competing objective of supporting
the needs of law enforcement. It is clear that to amend the law and allow familial
searching of NDDB data would provide police with the most efficient means of
conducting familial searches, as it would allow application of this technique to an
existing and growing NDDB profile collection. Yet, this potential policy direction
has not received universal support. While the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) has spoken in favour of the move, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
has spoken against it, citing concerns over the “. . . legal, moral and operational
aspects of familial searches”.28 The issue is now on the federal government’s
agenda as it considers future amendments to the NDDB’s legislative framework.29
The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, a body tasked
with reviewing the DNA Identification Act in 2010, has indicated a pressing need
for further study of the issue before legislative action is taken on the matter.30 In
addition to weighing the tension between the needs of law enforcement and indivi-
dual Charter rights, the response to the government’s request must situate familial
searching within the broader Canadian legal context and amongst existing practices
in policing. A key part of this discussion is the policy consideration presented by
the relationship that would emerge between familial searching of the NDDB and
the current law on police use of abandoned DNA.31 Towards that aim, the current
Canadian law on forensic use of abandoned DNA is explained in the next section.
27 See discussion in Ilhan Ilkilic, “Coming to Grips with Genetic Exceptionalism: Roots
and Reach of an Explanatory Model” (2009) Medicine Studies 131 [Ilkilic]. See also
the UNESCO International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003) at Article 4,
which confers a special status on DNA for the reasons cited above.
28 On the RCMP position see: NDDB Advisory Committee Annual Report, 2009-2010,
supra note 3 at 20. See remarks made by the Assistant Privacy Commissioner in a
public speech: Chantal Bernier, “Privacy and DNA Databanks: Harnessing the Power
of DNA Analysis in a Democratic Society” (Speech delivered at the Toronto Police
Centre of Forensic Sciences, May 2010), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner
of Canada, online: <http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/sp-d/2010/sp-
d_20100310_cb_e.asp>. Constitutional questions to explore include whether familial
searching infringes on individual rights under sections 7, 8, 10, and 15. For further
discussion, see: Bellamy-Royds & Norris, supra note 5 at 18.
29 Standing Senate Committee Review, supra note 7 at 64.
30 Ibid.
31 There are additional concerns brought on by familial searching that are beyond the
scope of this article to discuss. For instance, there is a need to investigate the potential
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II. THE LAW ON ABANDONED DNA
The law on police use of abandoned DNA has largely developed against sec-
tion 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides that
“[e]veryone has the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure”.32 The
Supreme Court of Canada received its first opportunity to issue a decision on sec-
tion 8 in 1984 with the case of Hunter v. Southam.33 In Hunter, the Court explained
that the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure encompassed a gen-
eral right to privacy, with every individual having a right to a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in relation to the state.34 The Court subsequently indicated that
Charter rights, including the right to privacy embodied in section 8, “must be inter-
preted generously, and not in a narrow or legalistic fashion”.35 As the line of cases
explored in this section illustrate, the courts have not delivered on this promise
when it comes to the rules on police use of abandoned DNA.
Since Hunter, privacy as a constitutional concept has been gradually devel-
oped against the backdrop of section 8.36 In determining whether a section 8 in-
fringement has occurred, the courts must ask whether (i) there was a search or
seizure by government, and (ii) whether that search was unreasonable.37 The in-
quiry must be informed by competing values to be balanced against individual
rights, including in particular the safety of the public and the need to support the
for discrimination through state use of familial searching. The discrimination issue has
received attention in the United States, and stems from the disproportionate representa-
tion of African-American people on the various forensic DNA data banks, which
would likely translate into a disproportionate effect of familial searching for the same
group. The issue arises in Canada in relation to Aboriginal peoples, who are similarly
overrepresented in the Canadian criminal justice system for complex historical and sys-
temic reasons. For further discussion, see: Carol La Prairie, “Aboriginal Over-Repre-
sentation in the Criminal Justice System: A Tale of Nine Cities” (2002) Canadian Jour-
nal of Criminology 181; Adam Schwartz, “DNA Familial Testing: Civil Liberties and
Civil Rights Concerns” (Speech delivered at the Symposium on Familial DNA Search-
ing, Northwestern University of Law, 2011) online: American Civil Liberties Union of
Illinois <http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Speech-DNA-familial-
testing.pdf>; Brett Mares, “A Chip off the Old Block: Familial DNA Searches and the
African American Community” (2011) 29 Law & Ineq. 395; and Sophie Rushton, “Fa-
milial Searching and Predictive DNA Testing for Forensic Purposes: A Review of
Laws and Practices” (Melbourne, Victoria: Victoria Law Foundation, 2010) at 15.
32 Charter of Rights and Freedoms Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Sched. B of
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) c. 11 at s. 8 [Charter].
33 Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch) v.
Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 1984 CarswellAlta 415, 1984 CarswellAlta 121
(S.C.C.).
34 Ibid, at para 25.
35 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1985 CarswellAlta 609, 1985 CarswellAlta 316, [1985] 1
S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.), at 344 [S.C.R.]; R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, 1988 Car-
swellPEI 7, 1988 CarswellPEI 73 (S.C.C.) at para 15 [Dyment].
36 Jane Bailey, “Framed by Section 8: Constitutional Protection of Privacy in Canada”
(2008) Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 279 at 280.
37 Ibid at 284; Dyment, supra note 35.
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investigative functions of law enforcement.38 This exercise is complicated by the
fact that investigative technologies continue to advance, causing a shift in the un-
derstanding of what constitutes a reasonable intrusion into the private lives of citi-
zens for law enforcement purposes.39 The issue is particularly pronounced with the
growing reliance on forensic DNA since Jeffreys’ discovery in 1984, and the nor-
malization of DNA profiling that has ensued as a result. Considered a novel science
when it was introduced, heavy reliance on DNA profiling in the law enforcement
context has led to a “CSI effect”, which refers to the tendency among juries to (i)
be unwilling to convict in the absence of DNA evidence implicating the accused,
and (ii) overestimate the reliability of DNA evidence when such evidence is pre-
sented at trial.40 As a result of these trends, uses of DNA that would previously
have been viewed as highly intrusive are gradually being accepted.41
38 The courts aim to achieve this balance by applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, which re-
quires a determination of whether evidence obtained in violation of s. 8 or any other
Charter right should be excluded from the criminal trial process because inclusion of
the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute by unfairly preju-
dicing the trial of the accused. The exercise requires that judges balance various factors
including those affecting the fairness of the trial, the seriousness of the Charter breach,
and the results that might flow from exclusion of the evidence: R. v. Collins, 1987
CarswellBC 699, 1987 CarswellBC 94, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). This approach to
balancing individual rights against the safety of the public has been called “quintessen-
tially Canadian” and has been criticized for having developed into an aggressive exclu-
sionary rule that should be scaled back so that valuable evidence is only excluded in
the most extreme circumstances: R. v. Burlingham, 1995 CarswellBC 639, 1995 Car-
swellBC 71, [1995] S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.), at paras 72-73. The operation of the exclu-
sionary rule as well as the benefits and drawbacks of the same are beyond the scope of
this article to discuss in detail.
39 See discussion in Michal Fairburn “Twenty-Five Years in Search of a Reasonable Ap-
proach” (2008) 40(2) S.C.L.R. 55 at 56.
40 The trend has been attributed in large part to the popularization of television shows
such as “Law and Order” and the “CSI” series where DNA evidence is often presented.
The argument is that the popularization of DNA evidence in this way has changed how
prosecutors present cases and how accused persons must frame their defense: N.J.
Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, “The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About Forensic Sci-
ence Affects the Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic Science” (2007) 47
Jurimetrics 357; Donald E. Shelton, Gregg Barak & Young S. Kim, “A Study of Juror
Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Ex-
ist?” (2007) 9:2 Vanderbilt Journ. Of Entertainment & Tech. Law 331; and Andrew P.
Thomas, “The CSI Effect: Fact or Fiction” (2006) The Yale Law Journal Pocket Part
70. It has been said that “[f]act finders are no longer impressed by the presentation of
DNA evidence but rather are critical of its absence”: C.H. Asplen, Report: The Non-
Forensic Use of Biological Samples Taken for Forensic Purposes: An International
Perspective (Boston, MA: Am. Soc. Of Law & Ethics, 2006) at 1.
41 In addition to the analysis of abandoned DNA explored in this article, consider the
change in the Supreme Court of Canada’s view on the need to obtain specific consent
for each use of DNA from its decision in R. v. Borden, 1994 CarswellNS 26, 1994
CarswellNS 437, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) to the one in R. v. Arp, [1998] 3 S.C.R.
339, 1998 CarswellBC 2546, 1998 CarswellBC 2545 (S.C.C.). In Borden, the accused
had been arrested under suspicion of having committed two separate sexual assaults.
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Modern genetic science makes it possible for small amounts of DNA to be
collected and analyzed, so that even tiny amounts of genetic tissue can be of tre-
mendous value to criminal investigators. Individuals shed or discard small pieces of
genetic tissue throughout the course of each day, and it is possible for police to
collect this type of evidence and link an individual to an anonymous piece of ge-
netic material found at a given crime scene. The situation has led to a number of
“DNA abandonment” cases in Canada. These cases show the courts applying the
two-part inquiry required for section 8 claims, ultimately determining in a number
of the cases that a claimant has lost his reasonable expectation of privacy in DNA
contained on an item that was abandoned, so that no “seizure” occurred within the
meaning of section 8 when police collected that abandoned evidence for forensic
purposes.42 As a result of these decisions, police can generally collect abandoned
items containing DNA to use as evidence without being constrained by the right to
privacy under section 8 of the Charter.
The first major case on abandoned DNA was R. v. Dyment, heard by the Su-
preme Court of Canada in 1988.43 Dyment had been in a car accident and was
brought to the hospital in an unconscious state, whereupon a physician took a blood
sample for treatment purposes by gathering blood that was flowing from his pa-
tient’s open wound.44 After learning that the patient had consumed a beer and anti-
histamine tablets, the doctor provided the blood sample to the police in order to
assist in the criminal inquiry into whether Dyment had been impaired at the time of
the accident. The doctor did not obtain the patient’s consent to provide the sample
to police and the authorities did not possess a search warrant.45 In determining
whether Dyment had abandoned his privacy interest in the blood sample, the Su-
preme Court of Canada drew a line between a seizure and a mere finding of evi-
dence, the latter occurring “at the point at which it can reasonably be said that the
individual had ceased to have a privacy interest in the subject-matter allegedly
seized”.46 On the facts of the case at hand, the Court found that while Dyment had
Police had adequate evidence to make an arrest for one of the offences and hoped to
connect the suspect to the other. In response to a police request, Borden provided DNA
samples for testing in relation to the offence for which he was under arrest. The sam-
ples were tested as part of the investigation of the other offence without specific con-
sent having been obtained for that use. On appeal of the resulting conviction, the Court
unanimously found a violation of Borden’s rights under s. 10 and excluded the DNA
analysis from evidence, finding that police were required to inform Borden of the move
from investigation of one offence to the other, which would have provided the opportu-
nity for him to give or refuse consent to use of the DNA in the new investigation. Four
years later, in R. v. Arp, the Court appeared to backtrack on the decision, finding that
where a suspect does not specifically attach limits to consent for the use of DNA sam-
ples supplied for investigative purposes, police may freely use the information for pur-
poses beyond that for which the information was initially collected.
42 John Burchill, “Mr. Stillman, DNA and Discarded Evidence in Criminal Cases” (2006)
32:2 Man. L. J. 5 at 6 [Burchill].
43 Dyment, supra note 35.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid at para 30.
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impliedly consented to the use of his personal information for medical purposes, he
had not abandoned his privacy interest in the information for other purposes.47 As
such, the use of the information by the police without a warrant constituted an in-
fringement of Dyment’s right to a reasonable expectation of privacy under section
8 of the Charter.48
The decision in Dyment left open the possibility that, on the right set of facts,
an individual could abandon his or her privacy interest in highly personal informa-
tion, which might include genetic information. In 1989, the New Brunswick Court
of Appeal heard the infamous case of R. v. Legere.49 The case followed an ex-
tremely tense situation, in which Allan Legere escaped from prison where he was
serving a life sentence for murder. The escape was followed by four murders and
one attempted murder in the surrounding area, and police investigators were ex-
tremely eager to apprehend Legere and secure his conviction for the crimes.50
When Legere was finally arrested, the RCMP extracted a DNA profile from blood
left on a tissue that the suspect had used to blow his nose with while in custody,
then tested the profile obtained from the genetic material against the crime scene
evidence.51 When the admission of this evidence was contested, the Court of Ap-
peal of New Brunswick found no infringement under section 8 of the Charter, ar-
guing that Legere had clearly ceased to have any reasonable expectation of privacy
in the genetic information contained within the tissue once the item had been
discarded.52
As section 8 matured throughout the 1990s, the Supreme Court clarified sev-
eral aspects of the Charter right to a reasonable expectation of privacy. First, as-
sessment of section 8 claims would necessarily be case-by-case in nature, and the
courts set out a “totality of circumstances” test that allowed for a flexible approach
tailored to the facts of each case.53 Moreover, it became clear that constitutional
protection would not attach to all types of personal information, but would be lim-
ited to protection of personal information that promotes the values of dignity, integ-
rity, and autonomy and that remains within a “biographical core of personal infor-
mation which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain
and control from dissemination to the state”.54
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid at paras 31, 40.
49 R. v. Legere, 1994 CarswellNB 8, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 139 (N.B. C.A.) [Legere].
50 Walsh, supra note 3 at 1.
51 Ramey, supra note 2 at 2.
52 Legere, supra note 49. Legere also protested against the admission of the DNA evi-
dence on the basis that DNA was a new science unfamiliar to his counsel. The court
also rejected this argument.
53 The “totality of circumstances” test was first set out in the case of R. v. Edwards, 1996
CarswellOnt 2126, 1996 CarswellOnt 1916, 45 C.R. (4th) 307, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11
(S.C.C.) at para 45 and reformulated in R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, 2004 Cars-
wellOnt 4352, 2004 CarswellOnt 4351 (S.C.C.) [Tessling].
54 R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, 1993 CarswellAlta 566, 1993 CarswellAlta 94
(S.C.C.). It has proven difficult to predict the type of personal information that will fall
within the “biographical core of personal information”. So far, the courts have indi-
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The Supreme Court of Canada was presented with an opportunity to weigh in
on section 8 and abandoned DNA directly in 1997. In R. v. Stillman, police de-
tained a 17-year-old male suspected of murder.55 Despite specific directions from
the suspect’s lawyers that the youth did not consent to providing DNA, police
forcefully seized several bodily samples and surreptitiously collected a discarded
tissue that the suspect had used to blow his nose before throwing the tissue in the
trash.56 When the admission of the DNA evidence was challenged in the court, all
of the judges agreed that the forced seizures constituted an infringement of section
8.57 A different reasoning was applied to the abandoned tissue, as it had not been
forcefully seized. With respect to the tissue and the DNA that it contained, the
majority found an infringement of the accused’s section 8 rights, but only because
the accused was in custody when he discarded the tissue and therefore had no
means of controlling access to his personal information.58 The remaining judges
would have followed the approach taken by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in
R. v. Legere to find that any reasonable expectation of privacy in the evidence had
been abandoned, regardless of whether or not the accused was in custody when the
item was discarded.59
Following the decision in Stillman, Canadian investigators continued to collect
abandoned items to assist in the investigation of crimes, though the custodial limi-
tation suggested in Stillman had to be clarified through subsequent case law. In R.
v. F. (D.M.) the Alberta Court of Appeal found that the accused had abandoned his
reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA contained on a discarded cigarette
cated that information that might qualify includes private writings contained within a
personal diary (R. v. Shearing, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 33, 2002 CarswellBC 1662, 2002 Car-
swellBC 1661 (S.C.C.)) and identifying information such as a name (R. v. Harris, 2007
CarswellOnt 5279, 87 O.R. (3d) 214, 225 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.)). On the other
hand, non-qualifying information has been held to include breath samples (R. v.
Padavattan, 2007 CarswellOnt 3196, 223 C.C.C. (3d) 221, 45 C.R. (6th) 405 (Ont.
S.C.J.)), electrical records detailing electricity consumption (Tessling, supra note 53),
odours emanating from a backpack (R. v. Brown, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, 2008 Carswell-
Alta 524, 2008 CarswellAlta 523 (S.C.C.)), and items placed in the garbage on the side
of the road (R. v. Patrick, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, 2009 CarswellAlta 482, 2009 Carswell-
Alta 481 (S.C.C.) [Patrick]). See discussion in Tim Quigley. “The Impact of the Char-
ter on the Law of Search and Seizure” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. 117 at 133 [Quigley].
55 R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, 1997 CarswellNB 108, 1997 CarswellNB 107
(S.C.C.) [Stillman].
56 It is important to note that the forced seizures took place before police gained statutory
authorization to compel exclusionary DNA samples from suspects in individual
investigations.
57 The Court also answered the question of whether the forced seizures constituted an
infringement of s. 7. All but McLachlin J answered the question in the affirmative:
Stillman, supra note 55.
58 Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the majority excluded the samples that were physi-
cally forced from the accused, but admitted the tissue as that was not forcefully seized.
Ibid at para 128.
59 See dissenting judgments, in particular the reasoning of McLachlin J, ibid at para 224.
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butt.60 While the accused was detained at the time that the item was discarded, the
Court found that he could have prevented the collection of evidence either by re-
taining his cigarette butts in his pocket and taking them with him after the interview
or by refraining from smoking altogether.61 Similarly, the courts found no section 8
violation when, on a break from court proceedings, police in R. v. Grywacheski
collected a cigar discarded into an ashtray.62 In R. v. Marini, no section 8 infringe-
ment was found when police collected two ginger ale cans left behind at the court-
house by the accused.63 In Marini, the judge argued that the courthouse situation
was not like the custodial situation in Stillman, and went so far as to suggest that
under the circumstances it had been up to the accused to reinforce his continued
expectation of privacy by rinsing the cans of his DNA before abandoning the
items.64
Having authority to collect abandoned items to expedite criminal investiga-
tions, police began to engage in trickery to obtain the evidence required by their
cases. In R. v. Nguyen, police officers offered the accused a piece of gum after he
refused to provide them with a DNA sample, then collected the gum for genetic
testing when the accused predictably threw it in the garbage.65 In this case, the
Ontario Court of Appeal found a section 8 violation based on the fact that the ac-
cused was entering a detention centre where he knew that gum was unauthorized
and would have to be discarded, so that the warrantless seizure was performed
under conditions comparable to those in Stillman.66 In terms of the trickery in-
volved, the court characterized the ploy itself as “passive and not objectionable”,
thus leaving the door open for similar operations in the future.67
The law on abandoned evidence was revisited in 2004, when the Supreme
Court of Canada heard R. v. Tessling, a case involving police use of Forward Look-
ing Infra-Red (FLIR) technology to capture images of heat patterns emanating from
the accused’s home in order to provide evidence of a marijuana grow-op operating
within the house.68 On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court of Canada found no
violation of section 8 through the use of the FLIR technology and in fact did not
even characterize the actions of the police as a “search” within the meaning of
section 8.69 Before coming to that conclusion, however, the Court dealt with the
60 R. v. F. (D.M.), 1999 CarswellAlta 872, 1999 ABCA 267 (Alta. C.A.); leave to appeal
refused 2001 CarswellAlta 391, 2001 CarswellAlta 390 (S.C.C.). The court also found
that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to clothes held
within his bedroom, so that police entry into his mother’s house to take clothes from
which to obtain a DNA sample did not constitute an infringement of s. 8.
61 Ibid.
62 R. v. Grywacheski, 2004 CarswellMan 93, (sub nom. R. v. Johnson) 117 C.R.R. (2d)
249, [2004] M.J. No. 109 (Man. Q.B.).
63 R. v. Marini, 2005 CarswellOnt 9228, [2005] O.J. No. 6197 (Ont. S.C.J.).
64 Ibid.
65 R. v. Nguyen, 2002 CarswellOnt 2, [2002] O.J. No. 3 (Ont. C.A.).
66 Ibid. Note that in this case, the evidence was admitted under s. 24(2).
67 Ibid.
68 Tessling, supra note 53.
69 Ibid.
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argument that Tessling had abandoned his privacy interest in the heat patterns by
allowing the heat to escape his home. Speaking for the unanimous Court, Justice
Binnie rejected the argument on the following basis: 
I do not think it can be said that “allowing” heat to escape rebuts an expec-
tation of privacy . . . Few people think to conceal their home’s heat loss
profile, and would have difficulty doing so if they tried. Living as he does in
a land of melting snow and spotty home insulation, I do not believe that the
respondent had a serious privacy interest in the heat patterns on the exposed
external walls of his home. However, the police were clearly interested in
the “heat profile” not for its own sake but for what it might reveal about the
activities inside the home. In that respect, to the extent that it is in issue, the
respondent maintained a subjective expectation of privacy.70
Though the case centered on heat patterns and not DNA information, the
above statement might have encouraged some hope that the courts would recon-
sider the characterization of the expectation of privacy held by individuals who
abandon items containing genetic material. After all, like in Tessling, police in the
DNA abandonment cases are interested in the items collected not for their own sake
but for what such items might reveal about their suspect. Moreover, like in Tessling
and despite the Marini court’s suggestion that people can reasonably be expected to
rinse soda cans before discarding them to assert a continued interest in any genetic
samples on such items, or the suggestion made by the court in R. v. F. (D.M.) that
people can effectively gather and pocket their genetic samples throughout the day,
individuals would have difficulty obscuring every genetic sample if they tried. Any
such hope for a new approach was misplaced, however, as DNA abandonment
cases heard subsequent to Tessling have confirmed that police remain free to col-
lect abandoned items containing DNA unless Stillman’s very limited custodial ex-
ception applies. This continues to be the case where police trickery is used to obtain
the sample. For instance in 2009, in R. v. Delaa, the Alberta Court of Appeal found
that a suspect who had been tricked into providing a piece of chewing gum to po-
lice under the pretense of a random gum survey held at a gas station had abandoned
his privacy interest in the DNA that was left on the gum.71
When it comes to state use of highly personal information derived from an
item characterized as having been abandoned, the courts have not delivered on the
initial promise to interpret Charter rights generously and with a view to protecting
individual privacy. The state of the law on abandoned DNA is concerning for sev-
eral reasons. First, it supports the argument that the Supreme Court has lost sight of
the purpose of section 8, and as a result has allowed an unbalanced intrusion into
the individual privacy interest in the name of public safety. Moreover, based on the
way that the courts have interpreted section 8 in DNA abandonment cases, it is
70 Ibid at para 41.
71 R. v. Delaa, 2009 CarswellAlta 670, 2009 ABCA 179 (Alta. C.A.); leave to appeal
refused 2009 CarswellAlta 1735, 2009 CarswellAlta 1734 (S.C.C.). Post-Tessling, the
rule on abandonment has also been applied to a number of “non-DNA” items with the
courts finding no s. 8 violation under the circumstances. See, for instance R. c. Law,
2002 CarswellNB 44, [2002] S.C.J. No. 10, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227 (S.C.C.) involving
documents held in a safe left in an open field; and Patrick, supra note 54, involving
garbage left on the side of the road for pick-up.
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doubtful that the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure will be able
to provide meaningful protection against increasingly invasive investigative tech-
nologies.72 In addition, the law in this particular area promotes an illogical expecta-
tion that individuals hoard items that may possibly contain genetic or other per-
sonal information in order to assert a continued expectation of privacy in that
information.73 Finally, the law is objectionable because of its greater potential im-
pact, including the effect it would have on individuals brought into an investigation
through familial searching of the NDDB, should the activity be authorized under
Canadian law.74 The next part explores this final point in greater detail, explaining
the relationship that would emerge between familial searching and the law on aban-
doned DNA in the event of an amendment to authorize familial searching of NDDB
data.
III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LAW ON ABANDONED DNA AND
FAMILIAL SEARCHING
This section argues that when used together, familial searching followed by
forensic analysis of abandoned DNA present a serious risk for genetic privacy that
must be acknowledged as a policy issue before changes relating to familial search-
ing are made to the DNA Identification Act. The relationship between these two
seemingly separate investigative techniques can be illustrated by a fictional set of
facts. Suppose that familial searching of the NDDB has been authorized by an
amendment to the NDDB and that Canadian police are searching for a suspect in
relation to an unsolved sexual assault and murder.75 Crime scene DNA has been
72 See Ian Kerr, Max Binnie & Cynthia Aoki. “Tessling on My Brain: The Future of Lie
Detection and Brain Privacy in the Criminal Justice System” (2008) 50:3 Can. Journ.
of Crim. & Crim. Justice 367 at 376, where the authors explore the question in relation
to recent advancements in brain scanning technologies used to detect lies during police
interrogations.
73 See Quigley, supra note 54 at 137, where the author expresses similar concern over the
Supreme Court of Canada’s stance on abandoned garbage: “To guard against snooping
by the authorities, should all citizens be advised to buy shredders to shred the myriad
papers containing personal information that we all throw into the garbage on a regular
basis? If not, we should also seriously consider whether luggage or other personal be-
longings, even if in a public place, or heat and electrical consumption information simi-
larly give rise to privacy protection.”
74 In addition to the policy issues discussed in this article, the law allowing police use of
abandoned items containing personal information may undermine the presumption of
innocence and the general idea that the presumption is supposed to guide all police
conduct: British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, “DNA Matching for Criminal
Identification Purposes” (1994) available online: <http://bccla.org/our_work/dna-
matching-for-criminal-identification-purposes/> at s. 6.
75 These most serious offences are purposely being used in this example instead of a less
violent or serious crime in recognition of the fact that, even if an amendment is made to
authorize familial searching, the Canadian government is unlikely to allow unrestricted
use of the technique. One of the likely limitations would be to authorize familial
searching for designated crimes only. The government may choose to impose addi-
tional restrictions, such as a requirement that police exhaust all other types of leads
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collected and an anonymous DNA profile derived, though a match to the anony-
mous profile is not found when a search for a full match is performed on the
NDDB. Investigators move to search for a partial match of the NDDB, which pro-
duces a profile with enough similarity to suggest a close genetic familial link.
The next step would be to locate and investigate genetic relatives of the indivi-
dual identified through the partial matching process. This step might involve the
use of a number of tools that could generate a possible family tree, including pub-
licly available records and various social media tools. For instance, in Colorado,
where familial searching is now permitted, official policy suggests that a partial
match might be confirmed or invalidated through review of a number of sources of
information, including criminal records, prisoner inmate profiles, visitor and tele-
phone logs, presentence investigative reports, court records, and state vital
records.76
Suppose the above procedures produce a list of ten possible genetic relatives
of the individual identified in the partial matching process. The next step would be
to narrow the list of potential suspects by trying to determine whether any one per-
son on the list is the source of the anonymous crime scene sample. To accomplish
this step, police might ask each of the ten individuals to provide a DNA sample for
exclusionary testing, and may even lay significant pressure on each individual in
order to secure these “voluntary” samples.77 An adamant refusal to provide a sam-
ple might lead police to be highly suspicious of the individual who refuses to coop-
erate.78 Since Canadian law does not prohibit police use of abandoned items con-
before conducting a familial search, or more in-depth analysis of the partially matching
profiles before the investigation continues. Of course, it is also open to the government
to leave the prohibition in place. This array of regulatory options will depend on the
outcome of the broader discussions.
76 Colorado, Bureau of Investigation, DNA Familial Search Policy (Colorado: Bureau of
Investigation, 2009) at s. 5(c). Other jurisdictions that allow familial searching note
that a background check will follow the identification of a possible genetic relative, but
provide only general guidelines on the means of confirming or invalidating the genetic
relationship. See, for instance, the policy issued in the state of California, which says
that investigators can attempt to confirm or deny the relationship by conducting more
in-depth DNA analysis, by performing a background check, and by reviewing any
available non-forensic information that might provide “additional evidence bearing on
relatedness”: California, Attorney General’s Office, Memorandum from E.G. Brown
Jr., Attorney General of California to all California Law Enforcement Agencies and
District Attorney Offices: DNA Partial Match (Crime Scene DNA Profile to Offender)
Policy (California: Attorney General’s Office, 2008).
77 This has been known to occur in real cases. For instance, the RCMP executed a mass
collection of “volunteer” samples following multiple sexual assaults and numerous re-
ports of missing women in Prince George, British Columbia. The force was criticized
on the basis that taxi drivers were specifically targeted and were compelled to either
provide samples or become suspects in the crimes: Council for Responsible Genetics,
Can A DNA Dragnet Undermine an Investigation? A Case Study in Canada by
Michael Vonn (2012) online: <http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/
GeneWatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=3D377>.
78 This occurred, for instance, in the Colin Pitchfork case, which was the first known case
successfully solved by DNA profiling. In that case, British police solicited DNA sam-
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taining DNA, police could attempt to collect such evidence from those who refuse
the request for voluntary provision of an exclusionary sample.79 In accordance with
the low threshold for abandonment set out in the section 8 cases explored above,
the evidence might be collected in the form of discarded cigarette butts, soda cans,
used tissues, half eaten food items or spit from the sidewalk.80 Alternatively, police
might engage in trickery to obtain the necessary sample, for instance by setting up a
fake gum survey like the one used in Delaa, offering up a personal item such as a
hairbrush to a suspect and collecting any strands of hair left behind in the brush,
offering to correct a suspect’s cowlick during questioning and plucking a stray hair,
or by inviting the suspect to send a response letter to a proposed class action law-
ples from approximately five thousand males in an effort to find the perpetrator of the
sexual assaults and murders under investigation. Two of the men refused, one being
Pitchfork. The refusal to provide a DNA sample was viewed as an indication of guilt.
For Pitchfork the assumption proved to be correct. It is crucial to point out, however,
that the other suspect must have had alternative reasons besides guilt for refusing the
request. Craig Seton, “Life For Sex Killer Who Sent Decoy to Take Genetic Text” The
Times, UK (23 January, 1988); Robert E. Astroff, “Identity Crisis: The Charter and
Forensic DNA Analysis in the Criminal Justice System” (1996) 5 Dal. Journ. Of Legal
Studies 211, at 215. Possible reasons to refuse a request for an exclusionary sample
might include concern over one’s genetic privacy and the level of protection that will
be afforded to the information once it is in the state’s control, or perhaps a strongly
held belief in the presumption of innocence. For further discussion, see Kevin M. Kee-
nan, Invasion of Privacy (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2005) at 149.
79 It might also be possible to obtain a warrant for collection of an individual’s DNA
under these circumstances. Canadian law authorizes judges to issue discretionary war-
rants for DNA collection in relation to specific investigations. A judge may issue the
warrant if he or she is satisfied that it would be in the overall best interests of justice to
do so and that: (a) a designated offence has been committed; (b) a bodily substance has
been found or obtained at the place where the offence was committed, on or within the
body of the victim of the offence, on anything worn or carried by the victim at the time
when the offence was committed, or on or within the body of any person or thing or at
any place associated with the commission of the offence; (c) a person was party to the
offence; and (d) forensic DNA analysis of a bodily substance from the person will
provide evidence about whether the bodily substance referred to in paragraph (b) was
from that person. Criminal Code, supra note 26 at 487.05(1). It is possible, though far
from certain, that evidence of a potential familial link might convince a judge to issue
the discretionary warrant in order to allow police to move forward with the investiga-
tion. If police were inclined to attempt to obtain a warrant and failed to do so, there is
nothing in the current law to prevent them from then resorting to the collection of
abandoned DNA as described in the example above.
80 The first three examples are drawn from the facts of Canadian cases explored above.
The remaining examples have been taken from real American cases where the courts
decided that the DNA samples had been abandoned for constitutional purposes. The
infamous case of the Grim Sleeper, discussed above, was solved when California po-
lice collected a half-eaten piece of pizza discarded by their suspect’s relative: McCar-
thy, supra note 19. Police collected spit from the sidewalk in Commonwealth v. Cabral
(2007), Docket No. 06-P987 (Mass. C.A.).
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suit and pulling DNA from the stamp when a letter arrives in the mail.81 Regardless
of how the exclusionary samples are collected, once obtained they provide police
with all that is needed to confirm or invalidate the lead provided through the famil-
ial search. If a match is found, the police would be able to continue the investiga-
tion against a single suspect, against whom they would hold highly incriminating
evidence.
It is true that the fictional example illustrates how a very serious and important
investigation may be solved through the combination of familial searching and col-
lection and analysis of abandoned items containing DNA. The story also illustrates,
however, how familial searching would effectively expand the reach of the NDDB
to include the genetic relatives of convicted offenders who have been required to
provide DNA for inclusion on the data bank. In other words, the example shows
how police could circumvent the limits that were put in place to justify the exis-
tence of the NDDB. This result is highly problematic, as the NDDB was purpose-
fully limited to individuals convicted of designated crimes, with the genetic surveil-
lance facilitated by the scheme typically justified by the view that such individuals
have a reduced expectation of privacy by virtue of their previous actions.82 The
same justification does not apply to individuals brought into the investigation based
on their genetic characteristics and potential genetic relationships. The collection
and analysis of abandoned genetic materials as the final step in the fictional exam-
ple illustrates how the law on police use of abandoned DNA leaves no meaningful
right to refuse to provide an exclusionary DNA sample for individuals brought into
the investigation based on their genetic relationship with a convicted offender. In
the situation described, this translates into a situation in which such persons have
no right to remain excluded from the NDDB until the state proves that their own
personal actions warrant their direct inclusion. This problematic result requires that
the relationship between the two investigative techniques be considered as part of
the conversation on whether to allow familial searching of the NDDB.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has explored the current interest in amending the law on familial
searching of the NDDB in Canada, the present law on police use of abandoned
DNA, and the potential relationship that would emerge between the two investiga-
tive techniques if an authorizing amendment is made in relation to the first. In re-
sponse to the Canadian government’s indication of a pressing need for further re-
81 Again, the examples have been derived from real cases. The strategic offering of the
brush and hair plucking occurred in the Canadian case of R. v. Love, 1995 CarswellAlta
798, 102 C.C.C. (3d) 393 (Alta. C.A.); leave to appeal refused [1996] 2 S.C.R. viii
(S.C.C.). The postage stamp ruse was effected by American police in State v. Athan
(2007), No. 75312-1 (Wash. S.C.). For further discussion of these cases, see Burchill,
supra note 42.
82 In accordance with this view, while discussing the use of DNA on Canada’s NDDB in
R. v. Rodgers, Justice Charron explained that convicted offenders “have a much re-
duced expectation of privacy” and that “by reason of their crimes . . . have lost any
reasonable expectation that their identity will remain secret from law enforcement au-
thorities”: R. v. Rodgers, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554, 2006 CarswellOnt 2499, 2006 Carswell-
Ont 2498 (S.C.C.), at para 5.
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search about whether and to what extent this amendment should be made, this
article has argued that the potential for combined use of familial searching and
abandoned DNA presents a significant policy objection to the possible change in
the law. While the Supreme Court of Canada has previously promised to interpret
the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure with a view to protecting
and upholding privacy rights, the interpretation of section 8 in DNA abandonment
cases has fallen short of this promise, leaving individuals with no meaningful right
to refuse police the use of genetic materials that are shed and discarded daily. The
lack of options to assert any expectation of privacy in genetic information must be
considered in terms of the potential effect on individuals who would be brought
under police suspicion through familial searching of NDDB data. One of the results
of a move to incorporate familial searching into Canada’s data bank would be that
the failures of section 8 in cases involving abandoned DNA would infiltrate NDDB
operations, by incorporating individuals who have not been convicted of a desig-
nated crime into the scheme. The result would be an intrusion into individual ge-
netic privacy against which Canadians were purposefully shielded in the creation of
Canada’s data banking scheme. Though this presents only one of the considerations
that must play into the conversation about the future of familial searching in Can-
ada, this article has made the case for viewing the matter as a serious policy issue
that deserves to be emphasized as part of this ongoing debate. 
